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INTRODUCTION
Sovereign insolvencies cause enormous losses to lenders, huge disruptions in
the debtor's population and its welfare, and extraordinary mobilization of
international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and
the European Central Bank ("ECB"), which were designed to safeguard the
financial system. Greece's insolvency displays all these phenomena, but it also
demonstrates the improvement that would be available from a sovereign insolvency
regime following three simple principles: (1) post-insolvency creditors should have
priority; (2) creditors should vote by classes; and (3) restructuring should be
conditional on the debtor's compliance with reforms.
This essay underscores the inability of creditors and multilateral organizations
like the IMF and the ECB to obtain credible commitments from debtors for
continued reforms and supervision. The contribution of this essay lies in identifying
this problem and proposing its resolution through a restructuring that is conditional
on continued debtor compliance.
Part II offers some historical anecdotes about the weakness of sovereign
creditors. Part III discusses a chronology of the Greek default, the negative effect
of Greek politics, and the inapplicability of inflation or departure from the
Eurozone as possible solutions. Part IV explains two collective action problems and
their resolutions. First, the sovereign debtor cannot commit to change its political
status quo and adopt growth policies. As a result, its creditors cannot consent to
restructuring and advance new loans. Multilateral institutions resolved this by
imposing reforms on Greece and by enticing its creditors to agree to a restructuring
through a two-step transaction with injection of new value for the creditors' benefit
and by accumulating bonds to be partially forgiven. Second, minority creditors
have the incentive to hold out for full repayment. Greece resolved this problem by
enacting collective action legislation and by triggering the collective action clauses
of its foreign-law loans. Part V explains how the cost of restructuring would be
much lower under the proposed regime. Part VI concludes by estimating that
lacking this regime has cost multilateral institutions (and ultimately taxpayers
worldwide) C39-664 billion, or about $51-$85 billion.
I. SOVEREIGNS V. CREDITORS FROM 550 BC To 1903
The experience of everyday life teaches us that creditors have the power to
compel collection of their claims. History, however, shows that creditors are
essentially powerless when brought up against sovereigns.
Our impression from daily life is not necessarily what one would have without
law. Rather, the power of creditors to activate the state's powers to compel
collection is a result of a legal and institutional structure designed to facilitate
credit. Creditors would not have power if the law did not give them the ability to
exert the state's powers to seize debtors' assets.
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A. Circa 560 BC: Perillos Burns
The historical inventor of capital punishment by fire for the Western World
was Phalaris, the despot of Agrigentum, a Greek colony in southern Sicily from
about 570 BC to 554 BC. The victim was enclosed inside the sculpture of a bull,
created by Perillos (of Athens, no less). When Perillos pressed his claim to be paid
for the construction of the bull, Phalaris made Perillos its victim.' This early
conflict between sovereign and creditor would not be the last to end with the
creditor's burning. Much better organized creditors were also to burn.
B. Circa 1300 AD: Templars Burn
In about 1300 AD, King Philip IV of France found himself deeply indebted to
the Knights Templar, a superbly organized multinational military religious order.
The result of the conflict was that the Templars burned at the stake.2
The Knights Templar was a monastic association formed under the authority of
the Catholic Church to facilitate the Crusades. The full Latin name of the
association, Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici, loosely
translates as Impoverished Allie[d Knight]s of Christ and the Temple of Solomon.
The Templar order was initially housed in the newly occupied Solomon's Temple
in Jerusalem during the first Crusade around 1119, by order of King Baldwin II of
Jerusalem. The church officially endorsed the Templar order in 1129, and a Papal
order of 1139 exempted Templars from local laws. This exemption increased the
mobility of the Templars dramatically, since they no longer needed to obtain
licenses or to pay duties to cross borders.
The economic power of the Templars grew exponentially. Not only did they
become a favored charity, but they also started offering a wealth management
service to nobles who desired to join the Crusades. The Templars also created the
precursor to the letter of credit or bank check. Pilgrims would give assets to the
Templars in their homeland and receive a letter stating their balance and
authorizing them to receive that value from the Templars in the Holy Lands.
The economic success of the Templars became enormous. In addition to vast
land holdings, they had a private navy, manufacturing, trade, and at one point
3owned the entire island of Cyprus. However, as the crusaders began to cede power
to the rising Turks, the Templars' fates came into question.
Despite the formidable power of the Templars, their fate as sovereign lenders
was disastrous. The conflict that ensued came to spell the end of the Templars.
1. Pindar, PYTHLAN 1 (Diane A. Svarlien ed., 1990), available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/h
opper/textdoc=Perseus:text: 1999.01.0162:book=P.
2. See generally MALCoLM BARBER, THE NEW KNIGHTHOOD: A HISTORY OF THE ORDER OF
THE TEMPLE (1994); SEAN MARTIN, THE KNIGHTS TEMPLAR: THE HISTORY & MYTHS OF THE
LEGENDARY MILITARY ORDER (2004); JOCHEN BURGTORF, THE CENTRAL CONVENT OF HOSPITALLERS
AND TEMPLARS: HISTORY, ORGANISATION, AND PERSONNEL 1099, 1120-1310 (2008).
3. MALCOLM BARBER, THE NEW KNIGHTHOOD: A HISTORY OF THE ORDER OF THE TEMPLE
(1994); EDWARD BURMAN, THE TEMPLARS: KNIGHTS OF GOD, (1990); SEAN MARTIN, THE KNIGHTS
TEMPLAR: THE HISTORY AND MYTHS OF THE LEGENDARY MILITARY ORDER (2005); KAREN RALLS,
KNIGHTS TEMPLAR ENCYCLOPEDIA 28 (Gina Taliccid ed., 2007).
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King Philip IV the Fair of France found his state insolvent and in debt to the
Templars. While not having the authority to tax the order's enormous holdings, the
king was able to mobilize the power of the state to arrest hundreds of Templars on
Friday the 13d' of October 1307. The Templars were tortured into false confessions
and burned at the stake. Figure 1 is a medieval illustrated manuscript that offers the
image of King Philipp overseeing the burning of the last Templar Grand Master,
Jacques de Molay.4
Figure 1: Illuminated medieval manuscript image of King Philipp IV the Fair (Philippe IV le Bel) of
France overseeing the burning of Templars, including the last Grand Master, Jacques de Molay.
The contest between a sovereign and a creditor has never been a close one.
Even a creditor as powerful as the Templars ends burned.
C. Circa 1882-1903: Invasion of Egypt and Venezuela Blockade
History offers few examples of the opposite phenomenon, of a sovereign
applying the state's power in favor of allied creditors. A famous corollary is the
placement of French and English controllers on the cabinet of Egypt on 1878 and
the subsequent English invasion of Egypt on 1882 (in reaction to Egyptian
intransigence). The theory that the British invasion was motivated by debt
collection rather than political expansionism is weak.
4. LES CAPtTIENS, http://www.histoire-fr.com/capetiens_philippe4_4.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2012); see also THE CLOISTERS... TEMPLE OF THE SUN, http://www.premiumorange.com/tapisseries-
licornes/CHASSE/01 1-%20Temple%20of%20the%20sun.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
5. See generally, DEREK HOPWOOD, EGYPT: POLITICS AND SOCIETY 1945-1990 (1st ed.1982).
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An example that is alleged to be close to an enforcement action is the two-
month blockade of Venezuela from December 1902 to February 13, 1903, by the
English, German, and Italian fleets. While some motivation for the war was support
of creditors, a very credible view is that the war, like England's invasion of Egypt,
was a response to Venezuelan intransigence.6 While Venezuela had been insolvent
for a long time, the conflict did not start until Venezuela took a British ship, The
Queen, in June 1902. Furthermore, the conflict was an opportunity for the
European powers to expand influence into South America. However, the revelation
of financial motivations defeated the justification of the war. As soon as the
monetary motivations for the war were revealed, popular support for the war in
England evaporated. The popular response is exemplified in the poem "The
Rowers" by Rudyard Kipling published on December 22, 1902 in the Times, which
derides a war to help "press for a debt!"0 Soon thereafter, many states entered into a
treaty not to pursue debt collection by force.8
In sum, creditors have never fared well against the traditional view of
sovereignty. The idea that a sovereign would risk a domestic army and political
discontent to collect private debts has scant support. Rather than being used as a
sword for collection, sovereignty was instead used to avoid liability, as the
examples of Perillos and the Templars show. History does not give creditors much
hope. Nevertheless, lending to sovereigns continues. Greece stars in the current act.
11 . 2 1 T CENTURY GRECO-MULTILATERALISM
The contemporary Greek insolvency drama has various interesting
perspectives. After a brief chronology, this part discusses how Greek politicians
and the media have failed to promote the long-term interests of Greece and how
inflation or abandoning the euro would not have helped Greece. The subsequent
part then explores how Greece's restructuring reveals the limitations of
restructurings and how to overcome them.
A. Drachma, Euro, Olympics, Insolvency
Until 2000, Greece had its own currency, the drachma. Greece ran moderately
high inflation, about 10% to 18%. In 2001, Greece joined the euro and started
enjoying cheap borrowing and fast economic growth. In the summer of 2004,
Greece hosted a very successful but costly Olympiad. Shortly after, in 2008,
Greece entered a recession that still binds it.
6. See MICHAEL ToMz, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOvEREIGN DEBT
ACROSS THREE CENTURIES 114-57 (2007) (empirically showing that no practice existed to enforce debts
by gunboats).
7. Ian L.D. Forbes, The German Participation in the Allied Coercion of Venezuela 1902-1903,
24 AusTL. J. POL. & HIST. 317-31 (Dec. 1978). See also NANCY MITCHELL, THE DANGER OF DREAMS:
GERMAN AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 96,252 n.122 (1999).
8. 1776-1949 1 Bevans 537 (Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment
of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts) available at http-//avalon.law.yale.edu
/20thcentury/hague072.asp.
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In February of 2010, the Greek government announced a revision of its
expected government deficit. Whereas the EU recommendation was for a deficit
under 3% of gross domestic product ("GDP"), Greece expected a deficit of 5% that
it subsequently revised to 13%. The credit rating of Greek debt deteriorated to junk
bond status, with the result that Greece could no longer borrow from the open
markets.
In April of 2010, Greece asked the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") for a
645 billion loan. The IMF, joined by the European Central Bank ("ECB") and the
European Union ("EU"), approved a short term loan to Greece of C110 billion,
conditional on the adoption of measures of austerity, cost reduction, and continued
oversight by the three institutions, dubbed the "Troika." The parliamentary passage
of the austerity measures triggered strikes and protests.9
In February of 2012, the Troika, with the need to refinance the previous loan
looming, joined with Greece and private sector lenders to agree on a restructuring
plan. The Troika would lend 6130 billion to Greece conditional on "private sector
involvement" ("PSI") in the losses from Greece's insolvency. Creditors holding
Greek obligations would receive obligations of a smaller face amount and longer
duration, as well as short-term obligations of the ECB. Thus, the Troika also
injected value for the benefit of the creditors. 10
Greece passed a law that its existing obligations (that were subject to Greek
law) can be amended with 2/3rds (by amount) approval of their holders and asked
its lenders to approve the exchange. Greece had also borrowed under bonds subject
to English law. The covenants of the English law bonds allowed exchange if 2/3rds
to 3/4ths of the bondholders (by amount) voted in favor. In March 2012, Greece
obtained the necessary majorities to exchange all Greek law bonds and sixteen
English law bonds." However, 20 English law bonds have failed to receive the
required majorities.12
One somewhat overseen aspect of the restructuring is the ECB's swap of
Greek bonds with a close maturity with longer-term bonds not subject to collective
action clauses. The ECB has said that it will eventually return any profits that the
9. For an extensive discussion of Greece's slide into default, see MATTHEW LYNN, BUST:
GREECE, THE EuRo, AND THE SOvEREIGN DEBT CRISIs (2011).
10. Alex Chambers & Christopher Spink, Greece Bond Restructuring Set for Friday, REUTERS
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/23/greece-restructuring-idUSL2E8DN7T
K20120223 ("Investors will receive two-year bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Facility,
which will account for 15% of the old par value.").
11. See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., Given Greek Deal, Investors May Reconsider Sovereign Debt,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/global/as-greek-
resticturing-looms-bondholders-think-twice-about-other-sovereign-debthtml?pagewanted=all
("[I]mpose a loss of as much as 75 percent on all investors").
12. See Stelios Bouras & Alkman Granitsas, Greece Faces Bond-Swap Holdouts, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230402
3504577319250078129544.html (stating that on May 15, 2012, Greece, caught between elections and
without a stable government, paid one of the holdout bonds in full); see also US Vulture Fund Profits
from Bond Payout, EKATHIMERINI (May 16, 2012), http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgil_w articles_
wsite2_1_16/05/2012 442339 (stating that a sovereign insolvency regime should preclude such a
payment to a holdout, despite its relatively small amount.).
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ECB would make from bonds acquired below par to Greece.13 In other words, the
ECB accumulated Greek bonds at prices well below par before the second step of
the restructuring and states that it will not make a profit on those bonds. Yet, while
buying those bonds, the ECB was fully aware of Greece's insolvency and had no
reason to be buying virtually worthless Greek debt. Further reflection reveals a
fascinating phenomenon. The ECB's willingness to forego its profit gives the ECB
a sizable and credible threat against Greece. If Greece does not comply with the
requirements of the ECB, then the ECB has the latitude to change its mind and
insist on full repayment of its bonds. Essentially, the ECB can bring Greece back to
insolvency at its discretion. Through this bond accumulation, the ECB is
ameliorating one of the fundamental problems of sovereign insolvency, the
inability to induce the debtor to comply with the demands of the international
community after the completion of restructuring.14
B. The Destructive Political and Media Establishment
Greece's own political and media establishments, whatever responsibility they
may hold for the crisis, bear very significant responsibility for aggravating it.
Moreover, their stances are in conflict with Greece's own long-term interests.
Although Greece may not have the cronyism and patronage problems of some
poorer developing countries, it is a laggard when placed in the European context.
Although world rankings for political patronage and cronyism are nonexistent, one
can analogize from attempts to quantify fraud and corruption perceptions. The
European Union's Flash Eurobarometer survey about fraud in state budgets placed
Greece at the lowest position in the European Union in 2008." In an amalgamation
of corruption surveys, Transparency International ranked Greece 80& in the world
in 2011, tied with Peru, Morocco, El Salvador, Colombia, and Thailand with a
Corruption Perceptions Index of 3.4. That makes Greece the laggard of the
Eurozone and penultimate in the European Union. The next worst showing of the
Eurozone is Italy, which scores 3.9 tying for 69h place in the World, then Slovakia
13. See, e.g., Gemot Heller, ECB Ready to Forego Greece Bond Profit, REUTERs (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/15/us-eurozone-greece-asmussen-idUSTRE81EOFU201
20215.
14. Granted, the EU contains legal mechanisms that condition payments to member states on
their compliance with its fiscal mandates. However, the ECB's bond accumulation and proposed
forgiveness adds the threat of additional liability to the threat of the withholding of funds, making it
more potent. For an example of legal conditioning of support, see Commission Regulation 1084/06,
2006 O.J. establishing a Cohesion Fund and replacing Regulation 1164/94, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 210)
(EC) ("Assistance ... shall be conditional on the following rules: (a) if the Council has decided in
accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty that excessive government deficit exists in a beneficiary
Member State, and (b) has established in accordance with Article 104(8) of the Treaty that the Member
State concerned has not taken effective action in response to a Council recommendation made under
Article 104(7) of the Treaty, it may decide to suspend either the totality or part of the commitments from
the Fund for the Member State concerned with effect from I January of the year following the decision
to suspend.").
15. See THE GALLUP ORG., CrIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF FRAUD AND THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD
IN THE EU27 7 (Oct. 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/flash/fl_236_en.pdf (stating
that 91% of the Greeks surveyed considered that the extent to which the state budget was being
defrauded was "rather frequent.").
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with 4.0 tying for 66h, while the rest of the Eurozone countries have indices of 5.5
or greater. Figure 2 ranks the countries of the European Union by their 2011
Corruption Perception Index, marking with asterisks the members of the
Eurozone. 6














Figure 2: The members of the European Union ranked by 2011 Corruption
Perception Index; asterisks mark members of the Eurozone.
Regardless of the inability to quantify and compare the political patronage and
cronyism of Greece to other members of the Eurozone, commentators consider it
an important source of the problem.'7 Whereas well-run states can have large
public sectors that operate efficiently, Greece's public sector appears to have been
staffed by patronage and to operate grossly inefficiently.1 The New York Times
reports of a bureaucracy of extreme waste, where one out of every five emplo Iees
works for the government and government jobs are rewards for political votes.
One of the EU's key demands for reform is Greece's reduction of the number
of its public employees. The patronage system is so deeply embedded in Greece,
16. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://cpi.
transparency.org/cpi20 1/results/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
17. See, e.g., Haris Mylonas, Is Greece a Failing Developed State? Causes and Socio-economic
Consequences of the Financial Crisis, TiE KONSTANTINOS KARAMANLiS INSTTUTE FOR DEMOCRACY
YEARBOOK 2011: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE CASE OF GREECE (2011), available at
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Mylonas fulltext.pdf.
18. See generally TAKIS S. PAPPAS, MAKING PARTY DEMOCRACY IN GREECE 69-74 (1999)
(discussing the intense political patronage of the post-WWII period and its resurfacing after democracy
returned in 1974).
19. Suzanne Daley, Bureaucracy in Greece Defies Efforts to Cut It, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at
A6.
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however, that this demand conflicts with a constitutional protection of the tenure of
public employees. 20
The constitutional protection of public employee tenure and other
constitutional law tensions complicated the financing agreements with the
European Union. The simple parliamentary majority (of 151 out of 300 seats) that
would have been sufficient for the ratification of the agreement by the parliament
to have the force of law was not sufficient. Rather, the agreement had to obtain the
three fifths (180 vote) majority required for constitutional amendments (although
full compliance would also require an intervening popular election).21 The
governing party did not have the necessary votes. From the perspective of the
governing party, the necessity of a political coalition was salutary. Rather than the
governing party alone bearing the enormous political cost of the reforms, all the
parties of the coalition would bear them.
One might think that the dire financial straits and the need for reform would
produce a coalition government, but that was not the case. Despite intense pressure
from allied European parties, no party would join a coalition government. A
coalition emerged only after the Prime Minister resorted to a surprise call for a
national referendum, which rocked world financial markets.22 The coalition
government has since undertaken an obligation to reduce the number of public
employees by 150,000.23
While the European Union continually insists on Greece's reduction of its
public employees and bureaucracy, Greece remains committed to the tradition of
the hydrocephalic state, with devastating results. Instead of trimming the employee
rolls, the state first increased taxation, causing an economic recession and
aggravating the problem. Then, the state tried to reduce its expenditures by cutting
salaries and pensions. Massive demonstrations followed, leading to fires and
20. SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [Constitution] Art. 103 para. 4 (GREECE) ("Public employees ... enjoy
tenure while their positions exist.").
21.
2. The necessity for a constitutional amendment is determined upon motion of at least fifty
representatives with a three fifths majority of the entire number of representatives in two
votes that are at least one month apart. This act specifies the provisions subject to
amendment. 3. After the decision to amend the constitution, the next congress ... decides
with the majority of the entire number of representatives about the provisions subject to
amendment. 4. If the amendment proposal received the majority of the entire number of
representatives but not the three fifths thereof per paragraph 2, then the next congress ...
decides about the provisions subject to amendment with three fifths majority of the entire
number of representatives ... 6. A Constitutional amendment is not allowed before the
passage of five years from the prior amendment.
SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [Constitution] Art. 110 (GREECE).
22. Rachel Donadio, Greek Leader Survives Vote, Bolstering Deal on Europe Debt, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/world/europe/greek-vote-european-debt.html;
Steven Erlanger and Rachel Donadio, Greek Premier Pledges Vote in December on Debt Deal, N. Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/l l/03/world/europe/greek-cabinet-backs-call-for-
referendum-on-debt-crisis.html.
23. See, e.g., Niki Kitsantonis and David Jolly, Greece to Eliminate 15,000 Government Jobs,
N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 6, 2012), httpi//www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/business/globa/data-show-greeces-
debt-ratio-growing-as-economy-shrinks.html?_r=1, ('T]he Greek government has promised to cut
150,000 jobs by 2015 from the public sector, which employs an estimated 750,000 people.").
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deaths.24 Large layoffs have still not occurred. The reduction of public employment
has occurred mainly through voluntary programs, which tend to lead to the loss of
honest and skilled employees, leaving behind an even more ineffective state.
Perhaps because of Greece's inability to reform its public sector, the course
that the European Union has steered for Greece is one of internal deflation. Greece
has been forced to cut the minimum wage, all salaries are expected to fall, and rents
in all leases have been subject to renegotiation. The general idea is to decrease the
cost of inputs for the Greek industry to regain competitiveness, essentially as it
would through mild inflation. (Inflation would leave nominal costs unchanged but
would reduce their real value and, thus, reduce the cost of Greek products abroad.)
Although deflation sounds appealing, it has led to enormous civil unrest.
The number and the magnitude of errors committed by the political
establishment seem astounding, yet remain unacknowledged. The media and the
political parties blame Europe for Greece's ills. Yet, no Greek politician or
journalist recognizes the need to reduce the government.
C. No Inflation, No Eurozone Departure
Some have suggested that Greece abandon the euro and induce inflation as
possible solutions to its predicament.25 Neither the ability to print its own currency,
thus inducing inflation, nor the ability to abandon the euro would help Greece.
The premise of the idea that printing currency is beneficial lies in the
assumption that the bulk of a country's obligations are denominated in that
currency. Credit markets give that option only to sovereign borrowers with extra-
ordinary track records of fiscal management, such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Japan. Most other sovereign borrowers receive their
loans in currencies that they do not have the authority to print. Greece borrowed in
euros that only the European Central Bank was authorized to print. Even if Greece
were not part of the Eurozone, it would have to borrow in a foreign currency.
Domestic inflation would impede Greece's ability to convert its domestic
currency into the foreign currency necessary to satisfy creditors. Leaving the euro
and inducing inflation would not help Greece avoid insolvency.
Even if inflation was to magically solve Greece's payroll and pension
obligations, it would still not be desirable. First, the domestic obligation to
employees and retirees is a small fraction of Greece's obligations. Even if Greece
could erase them, it would still be insolvent. Second, when a state tries to print its
24. See, e.g., Niki Kitsantonis and Rachel Donadio, Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan
After Riots Rage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), http-//www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/world/
europe/greeks-pessimistic-in-anti-austerity-protests.html?pagewanted=all.
25. See, e.g., Stergios Skaperdas, How to Leave the Euro, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/opinion/how-greece-could-leave-the-euro.html. See also Simon
Johnson et al., Economist Q. & A. on Europe's Debt Accord, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://econo-
mix.blogs.nytimes.com/20l1/07/22/economist-q-a-on-europes-debt-accord/ (comment of Laura
D'Andrea Tyson) ("If Greece were not part of a common currency area, it would almost certainly follow
the successful adjustment path of other developing economies from a deep financial crisis - official
assistance from the I.M.F. or another source of public funds; austerity; debt restructuring; and a massive
nominal and real depreciation of its currency to boost its competitiveness and growth. But as long as
Greece remains part of the euro zone, this option is not available.").
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way out of default, the result is hyperinflation, not mild inflation. In historic
examples of hyperinflation, prices have doubled every few days.26 Third,
hyperinflation harms all savers, undermines the incentive to save, and distorts
savings away from lending and banks and into inflation-proof assets, such as real
estate. Hyperinflation produces a general distortion in economic activity.
Hyperinflation rewards, for example, marking up merchandise rather than
improving business operations. Hyperinflation would be devastatingly worse for all
Greeks than the pay cuts that public employees and retirees have suffered.
III. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
By February 2012, Greece's predicament was one of inescapable insolvency.
Neither reducing the state's payrolls, nor inducing deflation, nor increasing tax
revenues could make Greece solvent. Greece could not make the payments that it
contractually had promised on its debt.
Greece's inability to service its debt could unfold in various ways. In the
environment that preceded today's multilateralism, a debtor nation that could not
service its debt would likely be excluded from the financial markets, meaning that
it would be unable to borrow. The state would be limited to immediate exchanges
to the exclusion of large and long-term projects. The state's infrastructure would
suffer and its economy's growth would be very slow. This is clearly a suboptimal
outcome, since new credit could produce growth. Growth, in turn, would enable
partial but quick repayment of the previous loans. However, the adoption of growth
policies would be politically inconvenient and disruptive for the debtor. Thus, the
first problem is the debtor's inability to commit. Namely, the problem is the
overcoming of social and political resistance to growth policies inside the debtor
country.
The Greek model of a two-step restructuring with bond accumulation and
value injection by the ECB solves the problem of the inability of the sovereign to
commit to adopt disciplined growth policies. Greece's collective action law and
clauses solved the second problem of the minority creditors' incentive to refuse the
restructuring (to "hold out") and insist on full repayment. The next paragraphs
explain these two problems from the perspective of game theory.
A. The Sovereign's Inability to Commit to Growth
The first level of analysis reveals the problem to be akin to the prisoner's
dilemma of game theory. The players are the sovereign debtor and the world
financial community or the creditors, acting as one. Table I shows game theory's
payoff matrix of the game.27 The debtor's moves are (i) to maintain the status quo,
26. See, e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT! EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
27. A very extensive and fascinating analysis of the restructuring of sovereign debt using game
theory is in VINOD K. AGGARWAL, DEBT GAMES: STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL DEBT
RESCHEDULING (1996). The analysis of the text has significant similarities with the two extremes that
Aggarwal considers, the creditor choices of "low concessions" or "high concessions" correspond,
respectively, to "no restructuring, no new loans" and "restructure & new loans." The debtor choices of
2012] 32
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
likely bureaucracy, patronage, and corruption (left column) or (ii) to induce growth
(right column) through politically inconvenient policies and discipline. The
financial community's moves are (i) to refuse restructuring and force economic
isolation (top row) or (ii) to restructure and provide new credit (bottom row). The
cells that correspond to the intersection of each strategy hold the results, for the
debtor in the upper right and for the creditors in the lower left. As a result of the
creditors' inability to compel growth policies on the debtor, the suboptimal result
obtains: creditors refuse restructuring and produce economic isolation.
Contemporary multilateralism, the Troika, solve the problem in the two-step
transaction with bond accumulation and value injection.28 First, the Troika imposes
growth measures on the debtor as a condition of short-term financing. Second, it
demands a restructuring from creditors as a condition of long-term refinancing,
while injecting new value for the benefit of the creditors to induce them to accept
the restructuring. Before the second step, the Troika accumulates Greek short term
bonds that are nearly worthless and exchanges them for long term obligations that
are not subject to the haircut but, if the debtor continues to comply with the reform
and oversight demands, then the Troika will eventually partially forgive.29 Thus,
the ECB maintains some pressure on Greece to continue to comply with reforms
after the restructuring.
Soverei ;n Debtor
Status quo Growth Policies
Little Inconvenient
No restructuring, growth growth





new loans Partial & Partial
slow but fast
_Repayment Repayment
Table 1: The payoff matrix of the interaction between the insolvent sovereign debtor and creditors,
acting as one.
This analysis shows that sovereign insolvency may lead to a suboptimal
outcome even if the creditors were acting as a single entity. Even if creditors faced
no other collective action problem, they would be unable to make the insolvent
sovereign debtor commit to adopting policies that favor growth in exchange for
new loans and partial forgiveness of past loans. The resolution of this problem by
contemporary multilateralism is an important feat. Compare this process, however,
"low adjustment" or "high adjustment" correspond, respectively, to "status quo" and "growth policies."
See, e.g., id. at 59.
28. Cf, Ed Bartholomew et al., Two-Step Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Market-Based
Approach in a World Without International Bankruptcy Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 859 (2004).
29. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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to the reorganization of an insolvent corporation. Pre-insolvency creditors do not
receive a payout from the post-insolvency creditors in order to consent to the
bankruptcy; no creditor needs to accumulate worthless obligations of the debtor to
induce the debtor's continued compliance and the reorganization happens in a
single step. The two-step resolution of the problem that includes the accumulation
of worthless bonds and the injection of value for the benefit of creditors is very
costly. Later, Part V discusses potential improvements in the regime of sovereign
insolvency.
B. The Minority Creditor's Incentive to Hold Out
Creditors face one more problem. Even if the majority of the creditors agree to
a restructuring, the last creditor has an incentive to insist on full repayment. The
fear that the last creditor may hold out for full repayment infects the collective.
Since each creditor would rather be paid in full, each has an incentive to withhold
support for the restructuring and to refuse to agree until after the others have
committed.
This second collective action problem also arises in many insolvencies under
national law. When debtors seek to renegotiate their debts (in a "workout"), each
creditor would benefit from holding out if the other creditors' acceptance of the
workout returns the debtor to solvency. Domestic law, however, gives the debtor
the threat of a bankruptcy filing which will force all creditors into a collective
proceeding that will impose equal treatment.
A collective proceeding analogous to bankruptcy does not exist in the setting
of sovereign insolvency. To the extent that the sovereign's obligations are governed
by the sovereign's own laws, the sovereign can change those laws to the
sovereign's advantage (provided that does not become expropriation or a breach of
the bilateral investment treaties).30 To the extent, however, the sovereign's
obligations are subject to the laws of a different jurisdiction; bankruptcy is not
available because the sovereign is not subject to other courts' jurisdiction. As a
result, creditors have been able to compel collection against private assets of a state
when there are non-governmental assets that are exposed to a foreign court's
jurisdiction.3
The game theory expression of the holdout problem considers the single
creditor's choice against that of all the other creditors. Table 2 illustrates game
theory's payoff matrix of the holdout creditor's problem. The columns capture the
choices of the holdout creditor. The holdout creditor may (i) refuse to restructure
(left column) or (ii) agree to the restructuring (right). The majority has the same
choice and can (i) refuse to restructure (top row) or (ii) agree to the restructuring
(bottom row). If the majority refuses the restructuring, the outcome is low growth
for the debtor and very slow repayment for both. If the holdout creditor agrees to
restructure while the majority refuses, then the holdout creditor receives even less.
30. See, e.g., loannis Glinavos, Investors vs. Greece: The Greek 'Haircut' and Investor
Arbitration Under BIT's (Working Paper No. 15.5.12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/
papers.cfin?abstractid=2021137.
31. See, e.g., G. Mita Gulati & KennethN. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUs. LAW. 635 (2001).
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If the majority, however, agrees to a restructuring, then the debtor can experience
growth and the holdout creditor has no incentive to consent to a restructuring. If the
holdout creditor manages to force repayment in full, then the majority will suffer a
slightly reduced partial payment (or merely a slightly riskier growth of the debtor).
After the majority has agreed to restructure, the holdout creditor's agreement to
restructure merely ensures the holdout creditor's equal partial payment (haircut).
As long as the holdout creditor can choose after the majority, refusing to restructure
offers a better outcome.
Holdout Creditor
Refuse restructuring Restructure




Very slow Very slow
Majority of repayment repayment
Creditors Full Equal partial
repayment repayment
Restructure
Reduced partial Equal partial
repayment repayment
Table 2: The payoff matrix of the holdout problem.
The holdout problem means that creditors who cannot be forced into a
collective process akin to bankruptcy have an incentive to become holdout
creditors. Since no bankruptcy or other collective process exists for sovereign
debtors, their creditors have the incentive to holdout.
Where the holdout problem is acute, a contractual solution has emerged,
although partial and imperfect. Sovereign bonds issued under UK law tend to
include "collective action clauses," meaning clauses that bind a minority to a
restructuring, exchange, or settlement that the majority accepts. Once a bond
contains such a provision, the holdout problem almost disappears because the
minority creditor, even objecting, will receive the same partial payment that the
majority receives.
For a small fraction of its debt, Greece had borrowed using such clauses. The
corresponding loans were bonds governed by English law that contained collective
action clauses. The collective action clauses state that if a majority of the
bondholders accept a settlement, exchange, or amendment of the terms of the
contract (known as the bond "indenture"), then the exchange or amendment occurs
for the entire bond, binding the minority.32 The majority required for restructuring
varied from two thirds to three quarters in monetary amount.
Most of Greece's debt, however, was governed by domestic Greek law and did
not contain collective action clauses. If Greece unilaterally refused to honor its
32. For the operation of sovereign bond clauses see, generally, the sources cited infra notes 35,
37 and 40.
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obligations, it may have been held to be an expropriation or a violation of bilateral
investment treaties, obligating Greece to reimburse the creditors.33 Instead, Greece
passed a law subjecting its obligations to mandatory restructuring if the
restructuring was accepted by two thirds of its creditors. 4 Thus, Greece exercised
its sovereignty to create a legislative solution to the holdout problem.
IV. SOVEREIGN INSOLVENCY LAW DESIDERATA
Greece's debt was restructured because of the two-step refinancing with bond
accumulation and new value injection and because of the collective action
legislation and clauses. Some differences between Greece's setting and a corporate
reorganization are worth underlining because they identify issues that a sovereign
insolvency regime should resolve, as explained below. While the conditional nature
of the restructuring sufpested here is unconventional, the IMF and others have
proposed such regimes.
First, the lack of priority for Greece's post-insolvency creditors meant that the
post-insolvency creditors had to create a two-step restructuring with an injection of
new value to induce private creditors to favor the restructuring. A better regime of
sovereign insolvency would avoid this by offering post-insolvency creditors
priority.
Second, creditors holding Greek bonds that were subject to foreign law voted
by bond rather than class. This helped creditors take holdout positions. A better
regime of sovereign insolvency would enable voting by classes that would bind
holdout attempts.
Finally, the absence of a mechanism to induce Greece's continued pursuit of
growth policies meant that the Troika had to obtain the credible threat of reinstating
some Greek debt by accumulating worthless Greek bonds. A better regime of
sovereign insolvency would induce compliance by conditioning the restructuring
on continued compliance by the debtor with reform and supervision demands.
A. Post-Insolvency Creditor Priority
When the insolvent sovereign faces inability to borrow and turns to the IMF or
the ECB, the current regime offers no formal arrangement granting the post-
insolvency creditors, the IMF and the ECB, seniority over past creditors. In
Greece's example, the post-insolvency creditors, the Troika, obtained priority by
structuring the two-step financing plan and conditioning the second step on creditor
33. See Glinavos, supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Given Greek Deal, Investors May Reconsider Sovereign Debt,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/business/globallas-greek-
restructuring-looms-bondholders-think-twice-about-other-sovereign-debthtml?_r=1&pagewanted=aH.
35. Discussed in detail in William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the
Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26-79 (2004); see also Steven L. Schwatcz, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000); Anne 0.
Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Speech at the Institute for International Economics Conference on
Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards: New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An
Update on Our Thinking, (Apr. 1, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.imf
org/extemal/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm).
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acceptance of a steep haircut. If creditors objected to the second restructuring, then
the first step would have been in vain. If the restructuring failed, Greece would face
slow growth and all the creditors, including the Troika as a first-step creditor,
would receive payments that would be severely delayed and have very small value.
To induce acceptance of the restructuring by the creditors, the Troika injected
additional funds for their benefit in the second step.36 Reorganization law prevents
exposing the post-insolvency creditor to this predicament by giving them
"administrative expense" priority over pre-bankruptcy creditors.
Compare the Greek restructuring to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The
filing of the bankruptcy petition divides two time periods. Prior creditors become
part of the collective proceeding. Prior creditors are, thus, exposed to the risk of
partial repayment and receive a vote in the proposed reorganization. Subsequent
creditors have priority because they finance the debtor's attempt to emerge from
insolvency and receive the priority of administrative expenses. The post-insolvency
lender does not need to give any value to pre-insolvency lenders because the post-
insolvency lender has priority.
Thus, a better sovereign restructuring regime would grant priority to post-
insolvency creditors over pre-insolvency creditors. If such a regime existed in
Greece's case, then the first-step loans from the IMF and the ECB would receive
priority and, thereafter, only the prior debt would be restructured. The two-step
model of the Greek restructuring would not be necessary. The cost of insolvency
would be reduced because the IMF would not have any reason to induce the
creditors to accept a restructuring by injecting additional funds. The formal priority
of post-insolvency loans would also prevent the differential treatment of IMF loans
from triggering loan clauses that prohibit preferential treatment of other creditors."
Finally, such a regime could eventually allow private lenders to replace the IMF in
undertaking post-insolvency financing and the associated supervision of the
sovereign's pro-growth policies.
B. Voting by Class
In the current regime, the amendment or exchange of bonds subject to foreign
law is subject to the loan contract (known as the "indenture"). When the indenture
contains a collective action clause, the exchange or amendment of the loan happens
if the required majority votes in favor. In other words, bondholders vote by loan:
the holders of each loan and each bond vote to accept the proposed restructuring
separately from holders of other bonds. This strengthens holdout creditors. In a
36. Chambers & Spink, supra note 10; Thomas, supra note 34.
37. See, e.g., G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, supra note 31, at 635-51. Gulati and Klee
discuss the exercise of a "par passu" clause by Elliott against Peru. Elliott is again in the news pursuing
claims from Argentina's restructuring which produced a greater haircut than that of Greece. See also.,
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reorganization, by contrast, creditors can be grouped into classes of non-dissimilar
creditors.38 This prevents holdouts.
The typical example of this holdout concern would have a creditor buy a large
position in a bond at a deep discount, with an eye to obtaining the voting power to
prevent consent to a restructuring. Consider that this bond's collective action clause
requires two-thirds majority. A creditor's position would need to be greater than
one third of that bond to have the power to block that bond's participation in the
restructuring. Then, when the bondholders vote on the restructuring, this creditor's
opposing vote would prevent that bond's restructuring. Its bondholders would
become holdout creditors.
In reorganization, an equivalent creditor's objection to the reorganization
could be overcome if the creditor voted in a class containing other similarly
situated creditors. Consider, for example, that the loan containing the collective
action clause is one third of a debtor's unsecured obligations. A creditor acquires
half of that loan's outstanding bonds. By voting against restructuring, this creditor
can prevent the restructuring of that loan in a workout. The other participants in the
workout can circumvent this holdout creditor's objection through a bankruptcy
filing. After the bankruptcy filing, the reorganization plan could define the entire
group of unsecured creditors as a class. The holdout creditor is only one sixth of
this class. If reorganization law requires a majority of two-thirds,39 then the
objecting creditor cannot, acting alone, defeat the reorganization plan.
A sovereign restructuring regime should allow voting by classes to reduce the
possibility of holdouts, as has been noted.40 Then, even creditors who could block
the restructuring of a specific bond would be bound by the majority decision about
the restructuring.
C. Conditionality ofRestructuring
A crucial difference between sovereign insolvency and corporate
reorganization lies in policy continuity. In a corporate reorganization, the debtor's
management will be accountable to the new set of shareholders that will result from
the recapitalization of the debtor pursuant to the reorganization plan. In contrast,
the sovereign's government will still be elected by the same population, be subject
to the same constitution, and responsible to the same social and political discourse
38. Similar creditors can be separated but dissimilar creditors may not be aggregated. See 11
U.S.C § 1122(a) ("[A] plan may place a claim ... in a particular class only if such claim ... is
substantially similar to the other claims ... of such class.").
39. United States law requires a two-thirds majority by amount and an absolute majority by
count, 11 U.S.C § 1126(c) ("A class ... has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors
... that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number...").
40. For an excellent classification discussion, see generally Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel,
Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMoRY
L.J. 763 (2004). Note also that the EU has moved toward collective action clauses with group voting
rather than voting by bond and those shall be mandatory in all EU borrowing from 2013. See EFC
Subcommittee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, Model Collective Action Clause Supplemental
Explanatory Note (Mar. 26, 2012), http://europa.eu/efc/subcommittee/pdf/supplemental explanatory
_noteonthemodel cac-_26 march_2012.pdf.
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through the same media. From this perspective, the frequency of repeated defaults
41is unsurprising.
Whereas the academic discussion of sovereign debt restructuring is largely
silent on the need for changes of policy by the debtor, the Greek example focuses
on it. The accumulation of worthless Greek bonds by the ECB gives the ECB the
credible threat of reinstating some Greek debt if Greece does not pursue growth.4 2
A better proposal would condition the restructuring on an ex post procedure, for
example, ten years after the insolvency. By making the entire restructuring subject
to annulment or a confirmation or ratification, the debtor would face the risk that
the entire forgiven amount of the restructured debt would reappear. In Greece's
example, such an objection would reinstate a much greater indebtedness than the
ECB's insistence on the full repayment of the bonds it has accumulated. Therefore,
this proposal would be a stronger incentive on the sovereign to reform.
Furthermore, the proposal would reduce the cost of restructurings by eliminating
the need for the ECB to accumulate worthless bonds.
Granted, disputes would arise from the proposed annulment or ratification of
'the restructuring ten years later, such as the propriety of creditors' objections or the
good faith of the sovereign debtor's effort to comply. However, such disputes
routinely arise in the context of long term contracts between sovereigns and private
entities. They receive satisfactory resolution through arbitration. A conflict
between the sovereign and its creditors about the vote on the confirmation of the
restructuring is suitable for adjudication or arbitration.
This proposal is subject to improvements. One concern about the proposal may
be that the reinstatement of all debt is so draconian a threat as to lose credibility.
The possibility of a fractional reinstatement may answer that concern. Also, the
proposed reinstatement after ten years may be too remote, allowing a government
subject to intervening elections to treat it as a problem for the next administration.
A potential biennial reinstatement of one sixth of the debt over twelve years may
answer that concern. Finally, a vote of the pre-insolvency creditors alone would be
biased by incentives to collect. A more complex and multilateral scheme would be
superior.
CONCLUSION: A COST ESTIMATE
The Greek case study allows a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the cost of
the absence of a bankruptcy regime with these features. The two components of the
cost are: (1) the cost of injecting value to induce the vote for the restructuring; and
41. See REINHART, supra note 26. See also Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoft This ime
is Diferent: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises, at 30, table 7, (Apr. 16, 20081
available at http*//www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/51_This Time _s_Different.pdf. (stating
that Greece had defaulted four times by 2008 since its independence in 1829 (Having now defaulted five
times puts it behind the six times (now seven?) that Portugal has defaulted since 1800 among European
countries).
42.. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Engineering an Orderly Greek Debt
Restructuring, at 4 (Jan. 29, 2012), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1994511 or http://dx.doi.org
/I0.2139/ssm.1994511 ("Another complicating factor is that a large volume of bonds - perhaps up to 20
percent of outstanding Greek government bonds - are in the hands of the European Central Bank
(ECB).").
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(2) the cost of accumulating depressed Greek bonds in order to maintain debtor
discipline after the restructuring. The former would not be necessary if post-
insolvency creditors had priority, the latter if a mechanism inducing debtor
compliance existed.
First, the cost of the injected value can be calculated from the fact that the
restructuring applied to bonds with a face value of about 6197 billion. Those
received value of 25 cents on the euro ("#/6"). Since the Troika injected about
150/6 and Greece 100/E to reach this 250/6, the Troika's contribution is 15% of the
total face value of 6197 billion, or a bit less than 630 billion. Therefore, the absence
of a rule giving priority to post-insolvency lenders cost about 630 billion.
Second, the estimation of the cost of accumulating Greek bonds before the
restructuring requires a guess about the price of Greek bonds absent the Troika's
accumulation program. A high estimate of the loss can be based on the notion that
Greece managed to restructure by paying 100/6. If no other buyers existed for
Greek bonds, traders (and the central banks themselves) who guessed that Greece
would pay 100/6 could profit from buying them at prices below that. Thus, one
guess is that Greek debt would trade at about 100/E without the Troika's
accumulation program. The Troika paid about 639 billion for bonds with a face
value of about 650 billion. If the market value of those bonds were 65 billion,
namely 100/E of face value, then the lack of a legal mechanism to impose on
Greece discipline after the restructuring cost the Troika about C34 billion, as a high
estimate. A low estimate comes from assigning a higher value to Greek debt.
Proceed with the assumption that, if the Troika were not buying, then Greek debt
would have 75% the value that the Troika paid. Then, of the 639 billion that the
Troika paid for the bonds, it wasted 25%, or E9.75 billion. Therefore, the low
estimate of not having a legal mechanism to impose post-insolvency discipline on
Greece is that it cost 69.75 billion.
Aggregate the cost of the lack of priority for post-insolvency creditors, 630
billion, with the estimate of the cost of the lack of compliance inducement, 69.75 to
634 billion. The lack of a sovereign bankruptcy regime cost governments and
multilateral institutions about 639 to 664 billion, or, in US dollars at the exchange
rate at the time of $1.32 per euro, $51 to $85 billion. These funds went to bond-
holders, mostly financial institutions. Recall that the IMF proposed a sovereifn
bankruptcy regime in 2002." The opposition of financial institutions defeated it.4
An alternative path to obtaining sovereign insolvency law exists. While the
multilateral attempt of the IMF attempt failed, sovereign insolvency law is possible
through a treaty between only the nations that have the largest financial
institutions." Subsequently, any nation seeking IMF assistance would have to adopt
the treaty before receiving the assistance. Financial institutions of the initial
signatories that would object to the application of sovereign insolvency law (as
43. Heller, supra note 133.
44. Krueger, supra note 355.
45. See Brad Setser, The Political Economy ofthe SDRM, 2008, Council on Foreign Relations,
available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SetserIPD_Debt SDRM.pdf.
46. For international treaties and their adoption see generally Louis HENKIN, How NATIoNs
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1979); for the EU context see Joseph Weiler, The
Transformation ofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
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they would when outvoted in voting by classes, and when post-petition creditors
would get priority) would be bound by their nation's early adoption of the treaty.
Financial institutions of the reorganizing nation would be bound by that legal
system's adoption of the treaty.
4'
